In Defence of Type-A Materialism

Roberto Horácio Sá Pereira

About author

Roberto Horácio Sá Pereira
Associate Professor
Federal University in Rio de Janeiro
Rua Engenheiro Alvaro Niemeyer, casa 113
São Conrado, Rio de Janeiro/ RJ Brazil
E-mailrobertohsp@gmail.com

Abstract


In this paper, I argue against the phenomenal concept strategy (henceforth PCS) and in favor of what Chalmers has called type-A materialism (2006; 2010: 111). On her release, Mary makes no cognitive discovery at all; not even a thin non-possibility-eliminating discovery, as Tye has recently claimed (2012). When she is imprisoned, Mary already knows everything that is to be known about the phenomenal character of her experiences. What Mary acquires is a new non-cognitive and nonconceptual representation.

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References


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DOI:

http://dx.doi.org/10.13153/diam.49.2016.921

Article links:

Default URL: http://www.diametros.iphils.uj.edu.pl/index.php/diametros/article/view/921
English abstract URL: http://www.diametros.iphils.uj.edu.pl/index.php/diametros/article/view/921/en

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