The Myth of the Given and the Grip of the Given

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Robert Hanna

Abstract

In this paper I argue that the Sellarsian Myth of the Given does not apply to all forms of Non-Conceptualism; that Kant is in fact a non-conceptualist of the right-thinking kind and not a Conceptualist, as most Kant-interpreters think; and that an intelligible and defensible Kantian Non-Conceptualism can be developed which supports the thesis that true perceptual beliefs are non-inferentially justified and also normatively funded by direct, embodied, intentional interactions with the manifest world (a.k.a. the Grip of the Given).

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How to Cite
Hanna, Robert. 2011. “The Myth of the Given and the Grip of the Given”. Diametros, no. 27 (March), 25-46. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.27.2011.426.
Section
Special topic – Perspectives on Experience – Kant and Contemporary Analytic Philosophy
Author Biography

Robert Hanna, University of Colorado at Boulder, USA

Robert Hanna
Professor
Department of Philosophy
University of Colorado at Boulder, USA
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