Reflective equilibrium. Part II: The vicious circle objection and the problem of the credibility of considered moral judgements (in Polish)

Artur Szutta

About author

Artur Szutta, PhD
University of Gdańsk
Institute of Philosophy, Sociology, and Journalism
ul. Bażyńskiego 4
Pl-80-952 Gdańsk


The article is the second in a series defending the method of reflective equilibrium and focuses on the vicious circle objection, according to which the method merely systematizes our considered moral judgements, which in turn are merely a reflection of our cultural conditioning, bias, etc., and thus have no epistemic credibility. The introduction of a certain level of coherence between these and moral principles (including background theories), the argument goes, does not elevate the epistemic status of our moral convictions. The defense of the method is carried out as follows: first, I critically present the objection and point out its weaknesses; secondly, I offer positive argumentation for the credibility of considered moral judgements. If they have at least some minimal positive epistemic status, then their equilibrium with moral principles and background theories can no longer be claimed to be an instance of a vicious circle.

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