A thought experiment against the determinism of the will (in Polish)

Ryszard Philipp

About author

Ryszard Philipp, PhD
University School of Physical Education in Cracow
Department of Humanities
ul. Jana Pawła II 78
Pl- 31-571 Kraków
e-mail: msg@philippozofia.pl

Abstract


The article presents a thought experiment against the deterministic theory of consciousness (i.e. free will), which is a consequence of a naturalistic (materialist) and physicalist approach to the problem of consciousness, prevailing in contemporary philosophy of mind. The physicalist approach presupposes the possibility of third-person descriptions of human actions in physical terms, and a fortiori the predictability, in principle, of human behaviour. The experiment emphasizes some consequences of this approach, especially some logical problems to which it gives rise.

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PDF (In Polish)


References


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DOI:

http://dx.doi.org/10.13153/diam.35.2013.510

Article links:

Default URL: http://www.diametros.iphils.uj.edu.pl/index.php/diametros/article/view/510
Polish abstract URL: http://www.diametros.iphils.uj.edu.pl/index.php/diametros/article/view/510/pl
English abstract URL: http://www.diametros.iphils.uj.edu.pl/index.php/diametros/article/view/510/en

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