Death: The Loss of Life-Constitutive Integration

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Doyen Nguyen

Abstract

This discussion note aims to address the two points which Lizza raises regarding my critique of his paper “Defi ning Death: Beyond Biology,” namely that I mistakenly attribute a Lockean view to his ‘higher brain death’ position and that, with respect to the ‘brain death’ controversy, both the notions of the organism as a whole and somatic integration are unclear and vague. First, it is known from the writings of constitutionalist scholars that the constitution view of human persons, a theory which Lizza also holds, has its roots in John Locke’s thought. Second, contrary to Lizza’s claims, the notions of the organism as a whole and somatic integration are both more than adequately described in the biomedical and biophilosophical literature.
Author Biography

Doyen Nguyen, Pontifi cal University of St. Thomas Aquinas (Angelicum)

Doyen Nguyen, M.D., S.T.D.
Pontifi cal University of St. Thomas Aquinas (Angelicum) Theology
1 Largo Angelicum
00184 Rome, Italy

E-mail: btursiopsdn@gmail.com

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How to Cite
NGUYEN, D. Death: The Loss of Life-Constitutive Integration. Diametros, 30 set. 2018.
Section
Discussions