The two-dimensional argument against materialism and its semantic premise

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Karol Polcyn

Abstract

David Chalmers argues that zombies are possible because they are ideally conceivable and that therefore consciousness does not supervene on the physical. In this paper I discuss the most influential criticism of the conceivability-possibility principle in the current literature. According to that criticism, the conceivability-possibility principle is unjustified because it depends on a certain unjustified assumption concerning the semantic conditions under which necessary statements can be true a posteriori, namely that a posteriority is due to contingency at the reference-fixing level, so that a necessary statement can be true a posteriori only if at least one of the concepts flanking the identity sign refers contingently.

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How to Cite
POLCYN, K. The two-dimensional argument against materialism and its semantic premise. Diametros, n. 29, p. 80-92, 1 Sep. 2011.
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Articles
Author Biography

Karol Polcyn, University of Szczecin

Karol Polcyn, PhD
Department of Philosophy
University of Szczecin
ul. Krakowska 61/ 69
71-017 Szczecin
Poland

karol_polcyn@gmail.com
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References

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