Descriptions of facts and their assessment - from myth to the obvious (in Polish)

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Jan Wawrzyniak

Abstract

The topic of the article is the distinction between descriptions of facts and their evaluation. This distinction is of interest to both in philosophy and in the theory of journalism. The article considers one of the assumptions supporting the view that journalists should clearly separate descriptions of facts from their assessment - the assumption that descriptions of facts can be separated from their evaluation. I present various interpretations of this assumption. I point out the existence of a relationship between the thesis of the possibility of separating descriptions from assessments and the belief that descriptions of facts are by their very nature objective, while assessments or valuations are subjective, and then I proceed to criticize the latter conviction.
These arguments are not intended to undermine the distinction between descriptions of facts and their evaluation. What I am trying to undermine are the metaphysical justifications and interpretations of this distinction.

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How to Cite
WAWRZYNIAK, J. Descriptions of facts and their assessment - from myth to the obvious (in Polish). Diametros, n. 25, p. 75-91, 1 Sep. 2010.
Section
Special topic – Ethics for professions
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