Morality, Normativity, and the Good System 2 Fallacy

Main Article Content

Wim De Neys
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0917-8852

Abstract

In this commentary, I warn against a possible dual process misconception that might lead people to conclude that utilitarian judgments are normatively correct. I clarify how the misconception builds on (1) the association between System 2 and normativity in the dual process literature on logical/probabilistic reasoning, and (2) the classification of utilitarian judgments as resulting from System 2 processing in the dual process model of moral reasoning. I present theoretical and empirical evidence against both premises.


 

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How to Cite
DE NEYS, W. Morality, Normativity, and the Good System 2 Fallacy. Diametros, v. 17, n. 64, p. 90-95, 12 Feb. 2020.
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