The Logical Structure of Intentional Anonymity

Main Article Content

Michał Barcz
Jarek Gryz
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6670-5642
Adam Wierzbicki
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5116-2163

Abstract

It has been noticed by several authors that the colloquial understanding of anonymity as mere unknownness is insufficient. This common sense notion of anonymity does not recognize the role of the goal for which the anonymity is sought. Starting with the distinction between intentional and unintentional anonymity (which are usually taken to be the same) and the general concept of the non-coordinatability of traits, we offer a logical analysis of anonymity and identification (understood as de-anonymization). In our enquiry, we focus on the intentional aspect of anonymity and develop a metaphor of an “anonymity game” between “perpetrator” and “detective”. Starting from common sense intuitions, we provide a formalized, critical notion of anonymity.

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How to Cite
BARCZ, M.; GRYZ, J.; WIERZBICKI, A. The Logical Structure of Intentional Anonymity. Diametros, v. 16, n. 60, p. 1-17, 30 Sep. 2018.
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Articles
Author Biographies

Michał Barcz, University of Warsaw

Michał Barcz
University of Warsaw
Institute of Philosophy
Krakowskie Przedmieście 3
PL-00-927 Warszawa

E-mail: mchal@barcz.pl

Jarek Gryz, York University

Jarek Gryz
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
York University
2049 Lassonde Building
4700 Keele Street Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M3J 1P3

E-mail: jarek@cse.yorku.ca

Adam Wierzbicki, University of Warsaw

Adam Wierzbicki
University of Warsaw
Institute of Philosophy
Krakowskie Przedmieście 3
PL-00-927 Warszawa

E-mail: wiezzel@gmail.com

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