Scientific Realism and the Future Development of Science

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Seungbae Park


Nickles raises many original objections against scientific realism. One of them holds that scientific realism originates from the end of history illusion. I reply that this objection is self-defeating and commits the genetic fallacy. Another objection is that it is unknowable whether our descendants will regard our current mature theories as true or false. I reply that this objection entails skepticism about induction, leading to skepticism about the world, which is inconsistent with the appeal to the end of history illusion. Finally, I argue that we have an inductive rationale for thinking that will lead our descendants to regard our current mature theories as true.


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How to Cite
PARK, S. Scientific Realism and the Future Development of Science. Diametros, v. 16, n. 60, p. 61-71, 25 Jun. 2019.
Author Biography

Seungbae Park, Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology


Seungbae Park is an associate professor of philosophy at Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology in the Republic of Korea. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Arizona in 2001, having specialized in philosophy of science under the guidance of Prof. Richard Healey. He taught at the University of Arizona, the University of Maryland, and POSTECH, before coming to his current institution in 2009. His recent publications are as follows:


Park, Seungbae (forthcoming). “Can Mathematical Objects Be Causally Efficacious?” Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.


Park, Seungbae (forthcoming). “The Anti-Induction for Scientific Realism”, Grazer Philosophische Studien.


Park, Seungbae (2018). “Can Kuhn’s Taxonomic Incommensurability Be an Image of Science?” In The Kuhnian Image of Science: Time for a Decisive Transformation? Moti Mizrahi (ed.), London: Rowman & Littlefield: 61–74.


Park, Seungbae (2018). “The Problem of Unobserved Anomalies”, Filosofija. Sociologija (to be assigned).


Park, Seungbae (2018). “Should Scientists Embrace Scientific Realism or Antirealism?”, Philosophical Forum (to be assigned).


Park, Seungbae (2018). “Rejecting Mathematical Realism While Accepting Interactive Realism”, Analysis and Metaphysics 17: 7–21.


Park, Seungbae (2018). “The Grand Pessimistic Induction”, Review of Contemporary Philosophy 17: 7–19.


Park, Seungbae (2017). “Critiques of Minimal Realism”, Problemos 92: 102–114.


Park, Seungbae (2017). “Scientific Antirealists Have Set Fire to Their Own Houses”, Prolegomena 16 (1): 23–37.


Park, Seungbae (2017). “Moral Vegetarianism vs. Moral Omnivorism”, Human Affairs 27 (3): 289–300.


Park, Seungbae (2017). “The Unificatory Power of Scientific Realism”, Disputatio 9 (44): 59–73.


Park, Seungbae (2017). “Two Criticisms against Mathematical Realism”, Diametros 52: 96–106.


Park, Seungbae (2017). “Selective Realism vs. Individual Realism for Scientific Creativity”, Creativity Studies 10 (1): 97–107.


Park, Seungbae (2017). “On Treating Past and Present Scientific Theories Differently”, Kriterion 31 (1): 63–75.


Park, Seungbae (2017). “Against Extrinsic Dispositions”, Review of Contemporary Philosophy 16: 92–103.


Park, Seungbae (2017). “Justifying the Special Theory of Relativity with Unconceived Methods”, Axiomathes. DOI: 10.1007/s10516-017-9336-4.


Park, Seungbae (2017). “Does Scientific Progress Consist in Increasing Knowledge or Understanding?”, Journal for General Philosophy of Science. 48 (4): 569–579.


Park, Seungbae (2017). “The Problems of Divine Location and Age”, European Journal of Science and Theology 13 (2): 41–53.


Park, Seungbae (2017). “In Defense of Mathematical Inferentialism”, Analysis and Metaphysics 16: 70–83.


Park, Seungbae (2017). “Defense of Epistemic Reciprocalism”, Filosofija. Sociologija 28 (1): 56–64.


Park, Seungbae (2017). “The Uniformity Principle vs. the Disuniformity Principle”, Acta Analytica 32 (2): 213–222.


Park, Seungbae (2017). “Problems with Using Evolutionary Theory in Philosophy”, Axiomathes 27 (3): 321–332.


Park, Seungbae (2017). “Why Should We Be Pessimistic about Antirealists and Pessimists?” Foundations of Science. 22 (3): 613–625.


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