Grounding and Logical Basing Permissions

Diego Tajer

About author

Diego Tajer, Ph.D.
CONICET, University of Buenos Aires
Puan 480, PC 1406,
Buenos Aires, Argentina



The relation between logic and rationality has recently re-emerged as an important topic of discussion. Following the ideas of Broome [1999] and MacFarlane [2004], the debate focused on providing rational requirements, which work as bridges between logic and epistemic norms. However, as Broome [2014] and Way [2011] observed, the usual requirements cannot capture some important aspects of rationality, such as how one can rationally believe something on the basis of believing something else. Broome [2014] proposed a few additional principles (“basing permissions”) for this purpose. In this paper I develop a more systematic family of basing permissions using the recent notion of grounding (Fine [2012], Correia [2014]). In particular, I claim that if Γ (logically) grounds A, and you believe Γ, then rationality permits you to believe A on the basis of believing Γ.

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