Constructivism in Metaethics: An Aristotelian Perspective (in Polish)

Jacek Jaśtal

About author

Jacek Jaśtal, assistant professor
Cracow University of Technology
PL31-155 Kraków
ul. Warszawska 24

E-mail: jjastal@pk.edu.pl

Abstract


Recently, constructivism has become one of the most important movements in metaethics. According to metaethical constructivism, moral judgements do not refer to moral facts but are constructed as solutions to practical problems. At the same time this claim is not seen as incompatible with cognitive realism. A variant of metaethical constructivism, developed in opposition to the dominant Kantian branch (Ch. Korsgaard), alludes to Aristotle’s practical philosophy. In this article I raise two issues. Firstly, I present a new version of the Aristotelian constructivism in metaethics, more elaborate than the previous proposals (M. LeBar). Its fundamental element is the concept of the coherence of emotional response seen as a complex cognitive-affective state. Secondly, I argue that the acceptance of the Aristotelian version of metaethical constructivism entails the need to accept constructivism in the area of the theory of knowledge, which is contrary to the metaethical premises of constructivism.

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References


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DOI:

http://dx.doi.org/10.13153/diam.45.2015.800

Article links:

Default URL: http://www.diametros.iphils.uj.edu.pl/index.php/diametros/article/view/800
Polish abstract URL: http://www.diametros.iphils.uj.edu.pl/index.php/diametros/article/view/800/pl
English abstract URL: http://www.diametros.iphils.uj.edu.pl/index.php/diametros/article/view/800/en

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