Reflective equilibrium. Part one: Explaining the method (in Polish)

Artur Szutta

About author

Artur Szutta, PhD
University of Gdańsk
Institute of Philosophy, Sociology, and Journalism ul. Bażyńskiego 4
Pl-80-952 Gdańsk
e-mail: aszutta102@gmail.com

Abstract


The article concerns the method of reflective equilibrium which, according to its advocates, allows for correcting and justifying our ethical views. Generally speaking, it consists in the identification of our considered moral judgements, the formulation of moral principles that explicate these judgements, and the elimination of conflicts between them and any relevant background theories. The result of this process of adjustment is an equilibrium in which these elements support and justify each other. Despite a number of advocates (J. Rawls, N. Daniels, R. Dworkin), the method has been heavily criticized (for example by R. M. Hare, P. Singer, or R. B. Brandt), the objections being that it is an example of a vicious circle or that it justifies ethical relativism. This article opens a series of three papers which aim to defend the method. The first step to realize this goal is to present and explain the method itself.

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References


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DOI:

http://dx.doi.org/10.13153/diam.35.2013.513

Article links:

Default URL: http://www.diametros.iphils.uj.edu.pl/index.php/diametros/article/view/513
Polish abstract URL: http://www.diametros.iphils.uj.edu.pl/index.php/diametros/article/view/513/pl
English abstract URL: http://www.diametros.iphils.uj.edu.pl/index.php/diametros/article/view/513/en

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