Legitimacy as a Mere Moral Power? A Response to Applbaum

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Published: Sep 1, 2012
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.33.2012.493
Keywords:
Applbaum duty to obey legitimacy power-liability Raz Simmons

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Jiafeng Zhu
University of Hong Kong

Abstract

In a recent article, Arthur Applbaum contributes a new view—legitimacy as a moral power—to the debate over the concept of political legitimacy. Applbaum rejects competing views of legitimacy, in particular legitimacy as a claim-right to have the law obeyed, for mistakenly invoking substantive moral argument in the conceptual analysis, and concludes that “at the core of the concept—what legitimacy is” is only a Hohfeldian moral power. In this article, I contend that: (1) Applbaum’s view of legitimacy, when fully unfolded, refers to more than a mere moral power and should therefore be rejected even by his own standards; (2) Applbaum’s rejection of competing views of legitimacy ultimately relies on a claim that he does not successfully defend, namely, the claim that moral duties are of absolute rather than prima facie force.

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How to Cite
Zhu, Jiafeng. 2012. “Legitimacy As a Mere Moral Power? A Response to Applbaum”. Diametros, no. 33 (September):120-37. https://doi.org/10.13153/diam.33.2012.493.
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No. 33 (2012)
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Author Biography

Jiafeng Zhu, University of Hong Kong

Jiafeng Zhu, PhD candidate University of Hong Kong Department of Politics and Public Administration Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong Email: h0993036@hku.hk
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References

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