In Defense of Brain Death: Replies to Don Marquis, Michael Nair-Collins, Doyen Nguyen, and Laura Specker Sullivan

John P. Lizza

About author

John P. Lizza, Ph.D.
Kutztown University of Pennsylvania
Department of Philosophy
15200 Kutztown Road
Kutztown, PA 19530
USA

E-mail: lizza@kutztown.edu

Abstract


In this paper, I defend brain death as a criterion for determining death against objections raised by Don Marquis, Michael Nair-Collins, Doyen Nguyen, and Laura Specker Sullivan. I argue that any definition of death for beings like us relies on some sortal concept by which we are individuated and identified and that the choice of that concept in a practical context is not determined by strictly biological considerations but involves metaphysical, moral, social, and cultural considerations. This view supports acceptance of a more pluralistic legal definition of death as well as acceptance of brain death as death.

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DOI:

http://dx.doi.org/10.13153/diam.1177

Article links:

Default URL: http://www.diametros.iphils.uj.edu.pl/index.php/diametros/article/view/1177
English abstract URL: http://www.diametros.iphils.uj.edu.pl/index.php/diametros/article/view/1177/en

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